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Germany planned its 2016 Chairmanship of the OSCE to establish the following 
goals “to renew dialogue and to restore trust among participating states and the 
security of Europe”.3 [30] Germany supported actual work on the priorities of its 
Chairmanship, which involved e.g.—inter alia—strengthening OSCE capabilities 
across the conflict cycle,4 handling old and new challenges of the fundamental 
freedoms in the OSCE region, strengthening good governance, and other new 
types of challenges. The German Chairmanship continued the work of the earlier 
chairmanships of previous years. There are state “chairs” (Switzerland and Serbia 
held the OSCE Chairmanships in 2014 and 2015, they are the OSCE Troika)5 and 
they started a “new model to address new challenges”.6 Related to that it should be 
noted (for this work’s keywords), that Foreign Minister Steinmeier said: “Germany 
wanted to durably strengthen the OSCE and its tradition of an equal dialogue 
among all participating States. This was the only way to rebuild lost trust and 
restore security on the European continent in the long term. This was all the truer 
against the background of the conflict in Ukraine, in which the OSCE had proved 
its outstanding importance and indispensability.” [30]
This analysis aims to present the work done throughout 2016. This paper shows 
and demonstrates that during the German chairmanship of the Organization 
a meaningful dialogue was lead and co-operation was pursued in various fields 
of common interest (mainly their role in context of the European security and the 
Ukrainian crisis) throughout the dimensions of the OSCE. The OSCE approaches 
security along these three dimensions: the politico-military, the economic and 
environmental, and the human.
1 The work was created in commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority 
project PACSDOP-2.1.2-CCHOP-15-2016-00001 entitled “Public Service Development Establishing Good 
Governance” in the Miklós Zrínyi Habilitation Program.
2 Ph.D., Associate Professor, National University of Public Service, Faculty of International and European 
Studies; e-mail: remek.eva@uni-nke.hu 
3 ZIF—Center for International Peace Operations: “Renewing Dialogue, Rebuilding Trust, Restoring Security”. [30]
4	 “I.e.	early	warning,	conflict	prevention,	crisis	management	and	post-conflict	rehabilitation.”	[30]	
5 The OSCE Troika was invented at the Helsinki Summit in 1992 to bring an element of continuity to the 
OSCE’s leadership. It is a format of cooperation between the present, previous and succeeding Chairmanships.
6 Germany made a declaration at the end of its presidency (Hamburg Declaration see later in the text) and the 
OSCE	Troika	invited	the	all	participating	States	commonly	to	work	“along	five	lines	of	action”.	I	believe	
its earlier goal has been achieved with this document. Hamburg Declaration. Source: http://osce.org/
cio/287946?download=true (Downloaded: 20.04.2017)
60 (16) 3 (2017)
É. REMEK: The German Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe…
This study is a part of my research work, so in the current text details also can 
be read with reference to the earlier and subsequent studies, which have already 
been or will have been written. This seems inevitable because, as I have pointed 
out above, my previous and next studies have referred/will refer to OSCE, crisis 
management and Ukrainian events, too.
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Introduction
Germany took over the Chairmanship of the OSCE on 1 January 2016. This was the second 
time when Germany had guided the world’s largest regional (pan-European) security organ-
ization [31] since 1991. Foreign Minister Frank-Waltzer Steinmeier was the organization’s 
Chairperson-in-Office,	while	Gernot	Erler	was	the	Federal	Government’s	Special	Represent-
ative for Germany’s OSCE Chairmanship in 2016. [30]
Given the title of the analysis, obviously the question is raised: what did the OSCE Chair-
manship mean for Germany? “Taking on the OSCE Chairmanship was a major project,” 
said Frank-Walter Steinmeier,7 “involving over 300 events in Vienna, Berlin, Potsdam, the 
entire	OSCE	area,	and	last	but	not	least	the	grand	finale	in	Hamburg,	the	Ministerial	Council	
in December 2016”. [1] From a political point of view, the Minister said, Germany had sent 
a clear message in the light of the tasks that they “believe in effective multilateral organiza-
tions, especially now in these times of turbulence, upheaval in the international order and, all 
over the world, the resurgence of nationalism…” [1] and they are “willing to actively take on 
responsibility in such situations”. [1]
It is known that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is the most com-
prehensive regional security organization, comprising 57 participating states from Europe, 
Eurasia and the Euro-Atlantic region.8
It	 should	 be	 mentioned	 that	 in	 1975	 thirty-five	 countries	 established	 a	 “cooperation	
forum”. Namely this was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
which was a real forum for dialogue and consultation from Vancouver to Vladivostok. This 
organization was founded with these goals: “to ensure peace, stability and democracy for 
more than a billion people”. [2: 24] The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
was the predecessor institution of the OSCE, which concluded with the signing of the Helsin-
ki Final Act. During the Cold War, the organization served as an important multilateral forum 
for	 dialogue	 and	 negotiation	 between	 East	 and	West.	 The	 CSCE	was	 officially	 renamed	
OSCE on 1 January 1995.9 [4]
Today the situation is similar to the then time, i.e. the OSCE is continuing to provide 
its	participating	states	with	effective,	efficient	tools	and	deals	with	current	security	issues.	
Although the OSCE lacks NATO’s military capabilities and the European Union’s (EU) 
7	 Former	OSCE	Chairperson-in-Office,	Germany,	2016.	At	the	end	of	Germany’s	OSCE	Chairmanship	in	2016,	
Foreign Minister Steinmeier took a very personal look back over the year and the next quotes came from 
there.
8 The OSCE is the only security-policy organization in which all European countries and Russia, the USA, 
Canada etc., and Mongolia are represented. Mongolia became the 57th participating State on 20 November, 
2012. [32] 
9 Budapest Summit marked the change from CSCE to OSCE in 1994. Among other things it is important that 
ministers formally “have adopted” the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security. [3: 3]
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 economic resources, yet no other security organization has a mandate to act in such a large ge-
ographical	area.	This	makes	OSCE	the	key	player	in	conflict	prevention	and	resolution,	crisis	
management and hence its uniqueness among internaional players. Quoting NATO Secretary 
General Jens Stoltenberg: “…the efforts of Germany’s OSCE Chairmanship to focus on 
renewing dialogue and strengthening the OSCE’s instruments and discussion  forums…”, [5] 
the OSCE is a “key player in many areas of particular interest to the Alliance.” [5]
The Changing Face of European Security
“In early 2014, nobody even assumed that only a few months later European security would 
be	significantly	compromised.”	[2:	26]	It	is	not	possible	to	formulate	the	essence	better	than	
the CNN’s riporter did it. “It began as a dispute over a trade agreement, but it mushroomed 
into	the	bloodiest	conflict	in	Europe	since	the	wars	over	the	former	Yugoslavia	in	the	early	
1990s.” [25]
In	Ukraine	people	were	dissatisfied	with	President	Yanukovych	and	no	longer	supported	
him. There was a growing and growing disaffection with the government. This situation 
eventually resulted in a demonstration, after violent and powerful anti-government demon-
strations, at the end it became military clash. It was the worst crisis not only for European 
security	but	also	for	global	security.	Germany	took	over	the	OSCE	Chairmanship	at	a	diffi-
cult moment in European security. The experts said10	that	“illusions	of	quick	fixes	to	the	deep	
strategic confrontation between Russia and the West should be avoided, but opportunities for 
practical	confidence-building	standards	need	to	be	kept”.	[17:	1]
This situation has seriously affected Europe. “The world will never be the same again”, said 
European Council President Herman van Rompuy after, when the Crimea was captured. [26]
It	was	under	these	circumstances	that	the	Chairperson-in-Office,	Swiss	Foreign	Minister	
and President of the Confederation11 launched the “Panel of Eminent Persons on European 
Security as a Common Project” (hereinafter called Panel) at the Ministerial Council in Basel 
in 2014. The idea was to make ready for use on the basis for full range security dialogue 
across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions, focusing on consideration the Ukraine crisis 
and especially the importance of security in the OSCE area. [7]
The Panel’s main task was to work out how to rebuild trust and reconsolidate European 
security on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris and on how to sup-
port the principles of OSCE. Therefore, the task is examining what kind of threats in the 
OSCE	area	and	researching	common	responses	to	confirm	again	cooperative	security.	It	is	
important to emphasize that the Summary of the Panel’s task outlines the particular role of 
the	OSCE	in	Euro‒Atlantic	and	Eurasian	security.	Its	role	is	unchanged,	namely	the	old-new	
task is preventing and resolving crises (that is also the case in Ukraine). The importance 
of this task can be measured in the long term. And fact it will have a strong effect on the 
German chairmanship work. Why? Because general guidance for the Panel’s work was 
given by the OSCE Troika, composed of the outgoing Swiss (2014), (the then 2015) Serbian 
and	 	incoming	 	German	Chairmanship	 (2016).	 The	 Panel	 is	 attempting	 to	 find	 input	 from	
the OSCE partici pating States, the OSCE Secretariat, other Institutions and Parliamentary 
10 Dr. Petri Hakkarainen is a Senior Diplomatic Advisor at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP) and 
Dr. Christian Nünlist is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich.
11 Didier Burkhalter.
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Assembly, multilateral organizations concerned with European security issues, civil society 
and think tanks, etc.12 [10: 20] As we see nowadays, this idea was an extremely good one 
for two reasons. On the one hand none of the existing international organizations, groups 
or	institutional	agreements	have	been	able	to	find	a	peaceful	settlement	to	the	conflict	over	
eastern Ukraine, including the Crimea situation. It means that it focuses on arms contorol, 
reduction armaments, or just questions of trust in political relations. On the other hand, I 
think that it is time, when the OSCE is able to realize its own comparative preferences, values 
i.e. its inclusive nature and consensus-based decision making. As we know the OSCE has 
been the most relevant framework to manage the Ukraine crisis (at present there are three 
missions).13 [8: 23–27]
The aims of the organization’s management were “to continue to play a useful role, the 
body must adjust its methods and strengthen its toolbox”. [9] What does it mean? This is 
a new opportunity for OSCE reform. As I have already mentioned above, the Panel’s task was 
preparing proposals to resolve the Ukrainian crisis. In June 2015, this Panel delivered two 
documents: [10: 2] an Interim report on the Lessons learned from the Ukraine crisis.14 And 
the Final report on the broader issues of security in Europe and in the OSCE area was to be 
presented toward the end of 2015.15 [11] From these documents we can clearly read that the 
OSCE has become relevant again. “The reason for this is not because the West and Russia 
have overcome their differences, but because their relations declined to a point at which both 
sides needed to turn to the organization’s crisis management tools to contain the risks of 
a dangerous escalation.” [9: 13]
In	this	process	the	Troika	is	a	significant	player	(in	our	case	Serbian,	German	and	Austrian	
chairmanship), through this process the organization will continue to stabilize the situation.
It appears that, the OSCE’s role may even increase further. Of course, it depends on many 
factors (participating States’ interest, economic situation, effect of sanctions against Russia, 
etc.). However, as long as this acute challenge dominates the agenda, there will be little 
chance for serious efforts on the longer-term reform of the organization. According to the 
experts’ view the Panel’s “initial paper on the lessons learned from OSCE crisis management 
in Ukraine was useful”. [9: 14]
Furthermore, it is important to realise that given the current polarization among member 
states, the Panel is “unlikely to achieve agreed conclusions on the future perspectives of the 
organization”. [9: 14] At best, it will present an interesting variety of options and diverse 
viewpoints. “Germany’s assumption of the OSCE chair in January 2016 was potentially more 
12	 It	is	mportant	to	quote	the	words	of	Fred	Tanner.	(He	is	Ambassador,	a	Senior	Adviser	in	the	Office	of	the	
OSCE Secretary General. He is the OSCE Secretariat Project Manager of the Panel of Eminent Persons on 
European Security as a Common Project): “The Panel and individual members also make use of opportunities 
to engage with high-level representatives of participating States (for example inside events at multilateral 
conferences and other international events). The Panel is assisted by a support unit that provides operational 
and logistical assistance in convening meetings as well as substantive support in drafting the reports. 
The OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions is contributing research and position papers. 
The	Panel	is	financed	through	voluntary	contributions.”	[7]
13 All OSCE operations are described by the next aspects: basic decision, tasks, deployment, duration, 
composition,	fianancial	implications.
14 This document focused mainly on operational issues.
15 “As soon as the Minsk commitments are in place on the ground, the Panel recommends that the OSCE 
Chairmanship, supported by the OSCE Troika, and in communication with the Ukraine Contact Group, launch 
a diplomatic process to rebuild the foundation of European security.” [11: 13]
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promising. For one, it brought the political level of crisis management on Ukraine, in which 
Berlin has been a leading actor, closer to the operational dimension handled by the OSCE. 
This could allow the OSCE to have a stronger political role and at the same time strengthen 
the effectiveness of the organization’s operational action.” [9: 14]
Thus, the German Chairmanship in 2016 was very operative, because Germany would be 
suitable to give a fresh power and dynamism to the work of the organization. As a leading EU 
member state with “strong relations with Washington and Moscow, Berlin has a better chance 
than	any	other	capital	to	break	through	the	existing	stalemate	and	help	the	OSCE	find	a	new	
sense of direction and purpose”. [9: 14]
We consider this organization as a comprehensive and inclusive forum, as a platform for 
real	dialogue	between	the	two	confrontational	sides,	but	its	capacity	to	influence	the	quality	
of their relations in the different task is limited. But the really important decisions are made 
within national framework or highlighted in the organizations (e.g. UN, NATO, the EU, 
Council of Europe, etc.). I would like to quote Pierre-Emmanuel Thomann about the EU and 
Russia that “they need also to identify common geopolitical interests in order to engage in 
a strategic dialogue. They could address three pivotal thematics at global, pan-European and 
regional levels: the continental axis, the missing link of European security and the common 
neighbourhood”. [12]
We must acknowledge that the geopolitical environment is changing. After Brexit and 
its consequences, the EU should focus more on the real events. For example, although the 
 European Union targets strategic autonomy, “strategic autonomy must be achieved over 
time”, [13: 16] but strategic autonomy does not mean that one does not need partners, par-
ticularly	NATO.	The	specifics	of	each	crisis	at	hand	will	make	clear	 the	appropriate	actor	
(the EU, the UN, NATO, country, ad hoc coalition, etc.) to take the lead in crisis manage-
ment.	[13:	16–17]	This	is	well	and	authentically	illustrated	in	the	figure	below.	(Figure	1)	
This	conception	is	built	on	the	international	organizations	in	which	the	OSCE	definitely	gets	
a role. Behold a not-well-known opinion, but the question (some kind of lack of European 
security) is worthy of further consideration. (Figure 1)
Fragmentation of the European and Eurasian Security Order
It can be treated as a fact that the challenges in front of the world are numerous and complex, 
that	 is	why	it	 is	difficult	 to	resolve	them.	The	situation	in	the	OSCE	area	is	characterized	
by a number of major “fragmentation zones” as well as security challenges. These can be 
classified	into	four	groups:	first,	fragmentation	and	divisions	within	and	between	societies;	
second,	fragmentation	within	the	integration	structures;	third,	conflicts	in	Russian–Western	
relations;	fourth,	negative	influences	from	the	outside.	[20:	11]	(Here,	only	the	second	and	
third group will be presented.)
The second group: fragmentation within the integration structures
The EU is a most special entity, modern integration structure in the OSCE area (all EU member 
states are at the same time participating States of the OSCE). “Its development is key for the 
whole of Europe, and the EU–Russia relationship is a major pillar of the European  security 
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system.”16  [20]  “NATO  is  also  facing  significant  challenges  in  relation  to  the  conflict  for 
example in Syria, where different member states are going on different and even conflicting 
strategies.”17 [20] Moreover, the current situation is difficult, therefore it is difficult to resolve 
burden sharing proportionally among stakeholders. An interesting example is the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU) that has not yet become a driver of economic cooperation among 
its member states (the Ukraine crisis has caused political problems among members),18 but 
their national interests’ realization depends on the relationship between Russia and the West. 
The situation is similar to the Collective Security Treaty Organization, too. The solution has 
been found by these countries through their multidirectional foreign and security policies.19
Third Group: conflict in Russian–Western relations
According to the experts’ opinion Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine crisis was worrying 
in the West, especially among Russia’s neighbours. That is to say after the Cold War, the 
Moscow’s policy purpose was the review of the European security architecture. This was 
a revisionist idea. At least this has moved Russia’s neighbours, which have already become 
members of the EU and NATO, “to seek credible reassurances from the Alliance and to 
move towards a deterrence posture vis-a-vis Russia”. [20: 14] The expert writings really 
indicate perceptible, some times a “Cold War behavior”, and it is determined that “this kind 
of essentialist approach is a really alarming sign”.20 [20]
How does all this relate to the German OSCE Chairmanship? So, this crisis or conflict is 
now more dangerous, with “no clear rules of the road”.21 [33] The German foreign minister, 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, an advocate of dialogue made the same (see before) point: “It’s 
a  fallacy  to  think  that  this  is  like  the Cold War. The current  times are different and more 
dangerous.” [33]
The Missing Link of the European Security
Another reading of the fragmentation problem examines the issue of European security as 
a whole. What do these “Olympic circles” mean? The interesting approach draws attention to 
the lack of “European security link”. (Figure 1)
16 More details of the EU’s internal disagreements, the deep socioeconomic North–South, Brexit and etc. are 
in [20: 11–13].
17 Ibid.
18 More details see in [20:12].
19 It means that they strive for enlargement their relations with NATO, the EU, the OSCE to balance their 
relationship with Russia.
20 By working group [20:14].
21 Sir John Sawers, the former head of MI6 said. [33] 
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Risk of continental fracture
EEU: Eurasian Economic Union 
OTSC: Organisation du Traité de sécurité collective, namely Collective Security  
Treaty Organization (CSTO) SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Figure 1. “Olympic circles” of Euro-Atlantic,  
European and Eurasian security to fix the missing  
link of European security. [12]
According to the experts again,22 it would be therefore interesting to imagine new treaties 
and institutions, resembling the “olympic circles”23 which would allow maintaining stability 
on the whole Eurasian continent. There is a common interest. However the missing Euro-
pean security can be restored on an equal and rule-based economic cooperation with the 
EU–Russia.	[12]	We	must	understand	that	the	OSCE	is	important,	but	specific	institutional	
arrangements might be necessary.
22	 Pierre-Emmanule	THOMANN	is	Scientific	Advisor	in	geopolitics	and	geostrategy	at	the	European	Institute	
for International Relations (IERI), Brussels.
23 “Olympic circle”: A new “security space” from Lisbon to Vladivostok would be the inner circle of the security 
space from Vancouver to Vladivostok. In	this	configuration,	we	would	find	the	EU	as	a	pivot/political	centre	
and Russia as a neighbouring pivot/political centre at the crossroad of overlapping security spaces from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok (NATO and OSCE, USA–EU–Russia), Lisbon to Vladivostok (EU–Russia), St. 
Petersburg to Peking (OCS) and Minsk–Duchanbe (OTSC). [12]
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The expert’s opinion says that there is a missing link in the European security archi-
tecture	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 fixed	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 a	 further	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 European	
continent between Euro–Atlantic and Euro–Asian alliances. We also have to assume that an 
enlargement of Euro–Atlantic institutions (NATO–EU–OSCE) to the whole of the Eurasian 
continent	 is	 impossible.	Why?	Thomann	 argues	 that	firstly,	 further	 enlargement	 is	 not	 on	
the EU’s and NATO’s agenda. Secondly, the Euro-Atlantic institutions are unable to handle 
the	geopolitical	diversity	of	the	Eurasian	continent.	“The	solution	to	fixing	the	missing	link	
in the European security architecture is based on the “geographical tightening” principle in 
the context of NATO’s and EU’s overstretched capacities. Geographical proximity would be 
a central criterion to build regional alliances in order to foster stability and prevent further 
Eurasian fragmentation.” [12]
The only question is how would it be possible to balance among the different states, the 
alliances and the political and security institutions in the area of the continental fracture? 
The answer is evident, that is the balancing can be solved using the OCSE dialogue and 
co-operation methods.24
The Five Priority Areas
“The German Chairmanship in 2016 was an interesting diplomatic experiment for the 
OSCE”, [14] because a real political “heavyweight” was taking over the Chairmanship. 
“Germany is the most powerful OSCE participating state ever at the helm of the organization 
in its 20-year history.” [14]
Under the motto “Renewing Dialogue, Rebuilding Trust, Restoring Security”, the 
German	Osce	Chairmanship	2016	planned	five	priorities.	The	most	important	priority	was	
the	Ukrainian	situation,	namely	focused	on	crisis	and	conflict	management	 in	and	around	
Ukraine. Furthermore, “Germany will also continue the OSCE’s long standing work on 
finding	 lasting	 solutions	 to	 the	 so-called	protracted	 conflicts	 in	 the	OSCE	area,	 including	
Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh and the South Caucasus.” [15] Secondly, they have to 
strengthen	the	OSCE’s	capabilities	at	all	 levels	 the	conflict	cycle,	but	 this	 idea	affects	 the	
increase of the budget, too. Thirdly, the OSCE has a major task in the area of the arms control 
and the renewal of the Vienna Document25	on	Confidence	and	Security-Building	Measures. 
This proposal is promoted by such seminar works as High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar 
which Berlin focused on (it has also been realized). Fourthly, the issue of the human dimen-
sion was highlighted. Germany payed special attention to this area, because it is related to 
current crises and security problems such as tolerance and non-discrimination, freedom of 
expression, freedom of the media, and minority rights, etc. “The human dimension is an 
area of considerable disagreement among OSCE participating States with Russia and some 
of its proxies accusing the West of double standards and distorting the balance between the 
three security dimensions of the OSCE.” [15] Finally, the economic (and environmental) 
dimension was on the meeting table. This would be a good opportunity to make better and 
more effective this dimension when there are no progresses in the other two (politico-mili-
tary, human) dimensions. The Presidency focused on two issues inside this dimension: good 
governance and connectivities (dialogue between the public and the private sector). This 
24 Between organizations like NATO, EU, OSCE, OCS, OTSC, etc. which should lead to more stability. [12]
25 More details on the Vienna Document. [34]
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dimension really received great attention during the German presidency, so much so that e.g 
“Good Governance was the main theme in 2016 year’s Economic and Environmental Fo-
rum, […] good governance was a key topic at the Economic and Environmental Dimension 
Implementation Meeting…”26 [16: 9]
After these the expert’s question is straightforward and legitimate: “Germany a neutral 
and honest broker?”27 [15] Germany’s priorities were generally welcomed and supported 
by most of the OSCE participating States. The real question is how did Berlin manage the 
renewed confrontation between Russia and the West? It seems that a common understanding 
was	missing	 (the	European	 security	 system	 is	 fractured,	 see	 above)	 therefore	 the	 finding	
an acceptable solution was waiting for the German Presidency.28 In addition, the Final Re-
port29 [35] is proof that “the role the OSCE could play today in the form of a common forum 
for	mediation	and	conflict	prevention	is	more	important	than	ever,	as	military	tension	and	the	
likelihood	of	accidents	and	conflict	escalation	is	increasing”.	[20:	8]
According to Stephanie Liechteinstein30 “with regard to the Ukraine crisis, Germany will 
be expected to act as honest and neutral broker and to help build consensus.” But neutral by 
all sides? In her view Germany is “the leading power within the EU and a strong member 
of NATO”. All the two previous Chairs, Switzerland and Serbia were neither EU nor NATO 
members. Switzerland was “well-placed to mediate between Russia, the West and Ukraine”, 
still it is neutral. Hence, Germany may be “viewed as lacking neutrality, especially when it 
comes to mediating between the parties” to the Ukraine crisis. Namely, Germany has sup-
ported sanctions against Russia within the EU and is a member of NATO. “Thus, for Berlin, 
its	engagement	with	Moscow	has	so	far	been	dominated	and	influenced	by	the	former’s	role	
in those two Western institutions.”31 [15]
The OSCE Chairmanship was a great opportunity for Berlin in connection with Moscow. 
First of all Germany was in the same organization in which Russia was an equal partner. 
Moreover, it was an organization where decisions were taken by consensus. “Germany can 
thus deal with Moscow in a more balanced way, not overshadowed by EU sanctions or mil-
itary rhetoric. This may open new possibilities to ease tensions, which today can neither be 
managed through the EU nor through NATO.” [15] Secondly, the changes within the EU 
and NATO have affected the Euroatlantic region. Germany was/is a powerful state within 
the two organizations. It was especially important that it could keep the opportunity of its 
OSCE Chairmanship in order to maintain a balance between parties (the EU, NATO and 
Russia).32 [17: 2]
“The	priority	 status	of	 the	Ukrainian	conflict	 and	 talks	with	Moscow	has	been	 shown	
by the appointment of Gernot Erler (SPD) as Special Federal Representative in the OSCE. 
Gernot Erler was a close associate of Minister Steinmeier between 2005 and 2009. He has 
served as Secretary of State in the Foreign Affairs Ministry in charge of Germany’s Eastern 
26 All details on the Report [16: 9–10]
27 Stephanie Liechtenstein’s question. 
28 It should be mentioned the Final Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons (details see above) could be useful 
in this context. For this to happen it is all-important that the dialogue on European security issues should 
continue permanently within the OSCE.
29 As recommended by the OSCE Network of Think Tank and Academic Institutions. [35]
30 This paraghrap is based on her complete study [15].
31 It is important to mention that German Chancellor Angela Merkel has always had a privileged relationship 
with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
32	 More	details	of	the	difficulties	in	paragraph:	Defusing Conflicts Outside the Vienna Agenda. [17: 2]
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policy and, since January 2014, as Federal Coordinator for Russia, Central Asia and Eastern 
Partnership.” [28: 2–3] The negotiating framework was “a perfect distraction from the mul-
tilateral diplomacy of NATO member states towards Russia, which is critical due to the 
suspended cooperation between the NATO Council and Russia”. [28: 3]
Although	the	Ukrainian	conflict	remained	the	most	important	task,	the	German		presidency	
continued to give political support to other observation missions, and cooperation with 55 
experts. [17: 3] They pad particular attention to Transdniestria, South Caucasus and Nagorno 
Karabakh. The Berlin presidency considered important the member states’ contribution to 
the OSCE budget, itself being the second largest contributor. The OSCE budget was €141.1 
million in 2016. [28: 3]
How	could	 the	German	presidency	 accomplish	 tasks	 of	 the	five	priorities	 area?	What	
methods and tools were used? We could keep asking questions endlessly, but there are also 
answers.
It was not easy, but Germany was able to make good use of its own potential. “Whether 
the	format	includes	ministers,	senior	officials	from	capitals,	or	ambassadors	in	Vienna,	infor-
mal high-level meetings should be encouraged as much and as often as possible to continue 
a	confidential	dialogue	aiming	at	bridging	the	gap.”	[17:	3]	Furthermore,	Germany	could	also	
use its OSCE Chairmanship to make easy Track One and Half33 or Track Two Diplomacy34 
“in	carefully	chosen	fields,	harnessing	the	capacity	of	think-tanks	and	research	institutions	
for a common cause”. [17: 3] So, the “keeping lines of communication” were open, the 
Chairmanship focused on small, concrete steps to begin improving the confrontational at-
mosphere and to create mutual trust. Five areas35 seem particularly well-suited to create these 
“cooperative islands”. [17: 2]
The	 following	 quotation	 is	 useful	 for	 a	 summary	 “The	Ukraine	 conflict	 has	 therefore	
contributed to a ‘German moment’ without (as yet) transforming it into a European mo-
ment”. [22: 112] German Presidency played pronounced role in crisis management in 
Ukraine and in the realization of negotiations between the Ukrainian and Russian parties. 
E.g. Steinmeier Foreign Minister presented the OSCE Observer Mission in 2014 and together 
with the Swiss OSCE Chairmanship made efforts to set up a special observation mission. 
Furthermore, Germany was closely concerned “in the shuttle diplomacy of the Swiss OSCE 
chairship for the establishment of a trilateral contact group at the beginning of June 2014 under 
Swiss	Ambassador	Heidi	Tagliavini,	which	led	to	the	conclusion	of	the	first	Minsk	agreement	
on September 5, 2014 between Moscow, Kiev and pro-Russian separatists.” [22: 125–126] 
This preference for the OSCE is also related to the OSCE tools (dialogue, cooperation, pres-
ence diplomacy), when the Swiss OSCE chairship was, which immediately offered OSCE 
support for crisis management. So in the end “as a result, the OSCE gained importance as an 
institution	for	crisis	management	and	emerged	from	the	conflict	reinforced,	while	the	EU	has	
been weakened.” [22: 126]
It seems to me this example demonstrates that the OSCE can be a relevant partner for the 
current Presidency, and this was proven during the German Presidency, too.
33	 Track	One	and	a	Half	Diplomacy	as	“unofficial	interactions	between	official	representatives	of	states”.
34	 Track	Two	Diplomacy	offers	insights	into	the	role	of	informal	and	non-official	discussions	in	resolving	
conflicts.	Informal	diplomacy	is	a	relatively	new	one	in	the	field	of	international	relations.
35 For details of areas see in [17: 3].
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Conclusion
Jean Monnet was right, who was often called the founding father of the European Union, when 
he said: “Without men nothing is possible, without institutions nothing is permanent.” [6] 
Later Jaakko Iloniemi [6] also pointed out the same thing about the OSCE. Quoting him in 
his own words “political and legal institutions that are strong enough to weather storms and 
upheavals are the best guarantee we have for an orderly and successful management of in-
ternational	relations”.	[20:	9]	It	can	be	stated	that	the	OSCE	can	fulfil	its	roles	and	mandates.
The German Foreign Minister himself thus appreciated the annual work: “Without a doubt, 
the path there is a very, very long one. But let me borrow a quote from Willy Brandt: Small 
steps, he said, are better than no steps. Willy Brandt was himself a trailblazer for the CSCE. 
He would advise to take the small steps now, while the large steps are still far off.”36 [36] And 
the German Foreign Minister said as OSCE Chairmanship in his closing remarks, left the 
participating States with a question: “A quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War, we 
find	ourselves	at	something	like	a	crossroads.	We	are	faced	with	the	fundamental	question:	
do we want to continue pursuing this vision of cooperative and comprehensive security or 
not?”37 [21: 4]
A remarkable statement by the foreign ministers of Germany, Italy and Austria to 
strengthen the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has been read 
on the pages of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. “Just in stormy times, we need a strong 
OSCE”, said with one voice Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Paolo Gentiloni38 and Sebastian Kurz. 
The	three	ministers	identified	some	common	areas	for	action,	such	as	“the	creation	of	new	
platforms for dialogue and for a lasting solution of the crisis in Europe, a new beginning of 
monitoring conventional arms, a common approach to global challenges. The ministers speak 
of “too restless times in Europe” that “have questioned the architectural pillars of European 
peace” and they again mentioned the Ukrainian crisis. [23]
To sum up the German OSCE’s method (cooperation, dialogue, presence diplomacy, 
trust) which at the same time is an effective instrument not only in the Ukrainian crisis, but 
it also would be a good example for crisis management elsewhere. And as Swiss Foreign 
Minister Didier Burkhalter once said: “The OSCE has become the eyes and the ears of the 
international community in Ukraine.” [29: 2]
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